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In this paper we analyse data from the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation to 
investigate the effect of employer-provided health insurance (EPHI) on job mobility from 1996 to 2000. First, 
we estimate the effect of EPHI on four month job turnover. It is found that, after accounting for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity, holding EPHI induces substantial mobility reductions for all demographic groups, 
ranging from 31% to 58%. Second, we evaluate whether the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act succeeded in mitigating insurance induced mobility reductions and we find that it did not.  
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   No longer need you hesitate about taking a better job because you’re
afraid to lose your coverage.
– President Clinton, at the signing of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996.
Health insurance and the labour market are inextricably interlocked in the United
States, where the vast majority of insured nonelderly individuals obtain their health
insurance through their own or a family member’s employment (Employee Beneﬁt
Research Institute, 2000). A major disadvantage of this system is that it may lead to
ineﬃcient mobility reductions if workers avoid pursuing higher productivity positions
for fear of losing health insurance coverage, a phenomenon termed “job-lock”. The
most obvious situations in which job-lock may arise are related to the prevalence of
pre-existing health condition exclusions, probationary periods for new coverage, lack
of insurance during unemployed job search or preferences for a particular plan that
might not be oﬀered by another employer.
The job-lock phenomenon has motivated a signiﬁcant literature. Although there
is some disagreement, recent studies suggest that employer-provided health insurance
(EPHI) reduces yearly job mobility by 25-50%, with mobility rates from data sources
used in this literature that range from 16% to 25%. Concerns about job-lock have also
played a central role in the national health insurance reform planning process. In 1985,
the federal government, as part of its Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act (COBRA), required employers to continue providing health insurance coverage to
workers who leave the ﬁrm for a speciﬁed period of time, and after 1990 there was an
expansion of eligibility for COBRA coverage.
With Bill Clinton’s ascension to the White House, major initiatives regarding
health care reform were expected and job-lock was an important issue in the new
Administration’s agenda. Universal coverage was the most notable feature of the
Health Security Act (HSA), which was unsuccessful. However, in 1996 President Clin-
ton signed into law the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
Although much less ambitious than the HSA, one of the several goals of HIPAA was to
1reduce job-lock and increase labour market mobility. HIPAA included several reforms
concerning access and portability in the employer group insurance market and also
excluded health status as a factor in setting premiums. However, HIPAA actually did
not impose many new requirements in the group market and several states already
had some form of legislations that met or even surpassed HIPAA standards.
This paper oﬀers two contributions to the job-lock literature. First, our empiri-
cal approach, which is diﬀerent from methods used in this literature, allows for the
possibility that holding EPHI is correlated with unobserved individual characteristics
(mover-stayer heterogeneity) that may inﬂuence mobility decisions. Second, the use
of the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a lon-
gitudinal data set which interviewed respondents up to twelve times at four month
intervals since 1996, allows us to evaluate the impact of HIPAA on job-lock.
1 Health Insurance and Job Mobility
1.1 Methods and Findings
During the past decade, there has been a substantial and growing body of work in-
vestigating the impact of EPHI on job mobility.1 A major concern in this literature
has been to ﬁnd an identiﬁcation strategy able to overcome the potential correlation
between the holding of EPHI and factors which aﬀect mobility independently from
health insurance. There are two main reasons why this correlation is likely to exist.
First, jobs that oﬀer health insurance are likely to be “good” jobs. If individuals are
reticent to leave these “good” (high wage and generous beneﬁt package) jobs for rea-
sons other than health insurance, then this would be incorrectly perceived as job-lock.
Second, EPHI may be correlated with individual unobserved characteristics that are
likely to inﬂuence mobility decisions.
The most popular identiﬁcation strategy comes from Madrian (1994) and involves
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) estimator, directly addressing the concern that EPHI
1See Gruber (2000) for an extensive analysis of the features of the health insurance market in the
U.S. and Gruber and Madrian (2002) for a critical review of the job-lock literature.
2is likely to be correlated with unobserved positive job attributes that tend to reduce
mobility. The idea of the DD approach is to compare two groups for whom job-lock
should operate diﬀerentially strongly because their insurance valuation is diﬀerent,
but for whom the other characteristics of the “good” jobs should be valued equally. If
job-lock is important, having health insurance coverage from a source other than one’s
current employer should cause a greater variation in mobility for those with EPHI than
for those without EPHI.2 This DD identiﬁcation strategy gives consistent estimates
under the condition that unobservables about jobs and individuals are diﬀerenced
away.
Most authors in this literature employ DD estimators to measure job-lock. Madrian
(1994) estimates insurance induced reductions of mobility of approximately 25% for
married men. Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Kapur (1998) ﬁnd no evidence of signiﬁcant
levels of job-lock. Buchmueller and Valletta (1996) obtain job-lock estimates that
range from 20% to approximately 48%, depending on the sub-group analysed, but
these estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant at standard levels for men. Anderson
(1997) ﬁnds that EPHI reduces job mobility for those for whom losing coverage would
be costly and that the lack of EPHI increases mobility for those who would beneﬁt most
by attaining it because of pregnancy or disability (she labels this type of behaviour
“job push”).
More recent papers do explicitly model workers’ decisions and the potential corre-
lation between unobserved individual heterogeneity and EPHI. Dey and Flinn (2003)
develop and estimate an equilibrium model of EPHI and wage determination. They
ﬁnd that jobs providing health insurance are substantially longer than those that do
not provide it. Within their model, heterogeneity in the distribution of ﬁrm costs of
health insurance leads to some ineﬃcient mobility decisions, but the majority of moves
from job to job are associated with productivity improvements.
Gilleskie and Lutz (2002) estimate a joint model of initial tenure, employment
2Apart from using an indicator for holding non-employer provided health insurance, Madrian
employs two other proxies for insurance valuation which are more direct indicators for potential
medical expenditures: family size and pregnancy of the spouse.
3status, marital status, the oﬀer of EPHI, the holding of EPHI, the holding of health
insurance from another source and the employment transition decision. The error
terms in these equations are decomposed into a permanent unobserved component
that may aﬀect diﬀerent outcomes diﬀerently and random noise and the distribution
of the permanent unobserved heterogeneity is approximated by a step function. The
equations of the model are allowed to be linked by dependence on the unobserved
heterogeneity which is treated as a random eﬀect and is integrated out of the model.
They ﬁnd no evidence of job-lock among married men and producing small estimates
of job-lock among unmarried males of between 10% and 15%.
Stinson (2002) estimates a joint model of wages, hazard of job ending and holding of
EPHI. Unobservable characteristics are modeled using person and job random eﬀects
that are correlated across the three equations. She ﬁnds substantial levels of job-lock
of 30-60%.
Our empirical strategy to estimate the eﬀect of EPHI on job turnover diﬀers from
the methods used in these studies, since we model the unobserved individual hetero-
geneity as a ﬁxed eﬀect and allow it to be correlated with EPHI.
Using statewide variation in continuation of coverage laws, which require employers
to continue providing health insurance coverage to workers who leave the ﬁrm for
a speciﬁc period of time, Gruber and Madrian (1994) ﬁnd that twelve months of
continuation coverage increase turnover by about 10%,3 which suggests that health
insurance does indeed cause reductions in mobility. In the second part of the paper
we evaluate a more recent legislation, the 1996 HIPAA, which also aimed at reducing
job-lock and increasing job mobility.
Finally, another interesting debate in this literature has to do with the temporary or
permanent nature of the job-lock phenomenon. Job-lock could reﬂect risk aversion on
the part of the average employee, arise from fear of being medically underwritten out
of coverage, concerns about long-run coverage or from long-run medical conditions.
On the other hand, job-lock might arise from short-run medical conditions such as
pregnancy. In this case, mandatory limited portability policies should be expected to
3A sizeable eﬀect relative to Madrian’s (1994) estimates of job-lock.
4alleviate job-lock. Gruber and Madrian’s (1994) ﬁnding that continuation of coverage
mandates alleviate a substantial portion of the job-lock problem seems to support
the view that job-lock has a temporary nature. However, Madrian’s (1994) evidence
is mixed, as she ﬁnds evidence of job-lock arising from both pregnancy and larger
families, which gives rise to long-run concerns.
1.2 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996
HIPAA was enacted on August 21, 1996. Interim ﬁnal rules implementing the HIPAA
provisions were ﬁrst made available to the public on April 1, 1997 and the HIPAA
provisions generally applied for plan years beginning after June 30, 1997. The HIPAA
key reform provisions regarding the employer group insurance market are summarised
below: 4
1. Increased portability through limitation on pre-existing condition exclusions and
crediting for periods of previous coverage. No ﬁrm can exclude from coverage for more
than 12 months (or 18 months in the case of a late enrollee) any condition (regardless
of its cause) for which medical advice, diagnosis, care or treatment was recommended
or received within the 6-month period prior to the enrollment in the insurance plan.
Furthermore, the period of any such preexisting condition exclusion is reduced by the
aggregate of the periods of creditable coverage (if any) applicable to the participant
or beneﬁciary as of the enrollment date. 5
2. Guaranteed issue in the small group market. Health insurance issuers in the
small group market must oﬀer insurance (that is, to oﬀer all actively marketed products
in the small group market) to all small ﬁrms (deﬁned as ﬁrms with 2 to 50 employees)
4Individuals can get private health insurance through their employer or by purchasing it in the
individual or non-group market. Small ﬁrms and big ﬁrms are often termed the small and big group
insurance market, respectively.
5Most health coverage is creditable coverage. A period of creditable coverage is not counted if,
after such period and before the enrollment date, there has been a 63-day period during all of which
the individual was not covered under any creditable coverage. A waiting period is not considered as
a break in coverage.
5wishing to buy it and must accept all eligible individuals without regard to health
status related factors.
3. Guaranteed renewability in the small and large group market. Once an insurer
sells health insurance coverage in the small or large group market, they must renew
coverage regardless of the health status of any member of a group.
4. Individuals cannot be discriminated against on the basis of health status re-
lated factors, both in terms of eligibility (including continued eligibility) and premium
contributions.
Before discussing the expected eﬀects of these provisions, it is important to note
that states diﬀered in their regulations prior to HIPAA. Table 1 identiﬁes groups of
states according to their regulatory environment prior to the federal legislation. 6 A
complete list of the states belonging to each of the groups is given in the Appendix.
Alabama (shown as Group A) is the only state that lacked all of the HIPAA
requirements in the pre-HIPAA period. Both Group B and Group C include states
that allowed to use health as a rating factor and lacked guaranteed issue, although in
the case of Group C, states lacked guaranteed issue but only of a number of insurance
products. Group D includes states that met all the HIPAA access provisions but they
did not exclude health status as a factor in setting premiums. Finally, it is worth
noting that there were several states (Group E) that met or even surpassed all the
HIPAA standards.
It might seem obvious that HIPAA should indeed have contributed to alleviating
job-lock in the states that did not a priori conform to all its requirements. Provisions
1 and 4 would be expected to reduce job-lock, specially for those workers with pre-
existing medical conditions or in poor health. Regarding provisions 2 and 3, they may
increase the number of ﬁrms that oﬀer health insurance coverage, therefore reducing
job-lock. However, given that HIPAA did not guarantee aﬀordability, these provisions
6Table 1 is based on the database collected by the Institute for Health Policy Solutions which
has been described and analysed by Long et. al. (1998) and Curtis et. al. (1999). This database
reviewed detailed information on the small-group health insurance reform statutes and regulations
adopted by each state prior to HIPAA, therefore providing a comprehensive picture of each state’s
regulatory environment prior to the federal legislation.
6may also lead to premium increases which would in turn exacerbate job-lock by re-
ducing the fraction of ﬁrms oﬀering health insurance coverage. According to the view
of Cutler and Gruber (2001), what HIPAA did was to codify the states regulations,
“making them uniform and expanding them in a minor way” (p. 42). Therefore, it
is ultimately an empirical question to evaluate to what extent the HIPAA regulatory
expansions succeeded in reducing job-lock.
2 Data
Our data source is the 1996 panel of the SIPP. The adults followed in each SIPP panel
come from a nationally representative sample of individuals 15 years of age and older
selected from households in the civilian noninstitutionalized U.S. population. Those
individuals, along with others who subsequently live with them, are interviewed once
every four months over the life of the panel. In the case of the 1996 panel of the SIPP,
respondents were interviewed up to twelve times. Each SIPP panel is divided into
four rotation groups. Each rotation group is interviewed in a separate month and four
rotation groups thus constitute a wave.
An important issue that must be addressed when using the SIPP data is “seam
bias”: respondents tend to propagate their status at the point of the interview (the
seam month) backwards through the preceding months. Therefore, we only use infor-
mation corresponding to the fourth month of each reference period (the closest one to
the interview date) so that seam bias is not a concern.
Following previous studies, we use a number of sample selection criteria. First, we
restrict the sample to individuals between the ages of 25 and 55 who are not enrolled
at school so that the analysis focuses on a group that has high attachment to the
labour force and the results are not confounded by the eﬀect of EPHI on the retire-
ment decision. Second, the self-employed are excluded. Third, following Buchmueller
and Valletta (1996) we also exclude agricultural workers, construction workers and
military personnel.7 Finally, we also lose a number of observations because of missing
7Buchmueller and Valletta (1996) point out the idiosyncratic nature of job turnover in the agri-
7information on some critical control variables such as wages or health insurance cov-
erage. The ﬁnal sample consists of 213,360 observations at four month intervals for
35,992 employees, spanning the period from March 1996 to February 2000. The panel
is unbalanced, with employees contributing between once and a maximum of eleven
times.
Each job is given a unique identiﬁcation number and turnover is deﬁned as chang-
ing employers, becoming self-employed or becoming unemployed during the next four
months. Overall, the four month turnover rate for our sample is 8.22% and the annual
turnover rate is 24.38%. These numbers are in line with mobility rates reported else-
where. Although job-lock really applies only to voluntary turnover, it is not possible
to distinguish voluntary from involuntary job changes in our SIPP panel.8
The core survey contains several questions on health insurance coverage. Respon-
dents are asked whether they had private health insurance during the previous four
months and those answering yes are asked whether it was in their own name, in some-
one else’s name or both. Respondents with insurance in their own name are then asked
whether the source of their insurance was their employer, former employer or union.
The percentages of employees holding EPHI are 72%, 71%, 77% and 51% for sin-
gle men, single women, married men and married women, respectively. This lower
percentage for married women is not surprising, given that 81% of them have an al-
ternative source of coverage (most commonly, the EPHI available to their husbands)
against only 21% of married men.
Descriptive evidence on the job-lock conjecture is reported in Table 2. This table
shows the frequency with which those employees who do and do not receive EPHI leave
their jobs in a period of four months. Not surprisingly, single employees have higher
turnover rates than married employees. To the extent that job-lock is a signiﬁcant
feature of labour market dynamics, turnover rates should be relatively lower among
cultural sector as well as the uniqueness of construction workers in both the seasonal nature of their
work and the tendency for their health insurance to be provided through unions, which explains their
high turnover rates combined with little discontinuity in insurance coverage.
8However, it should be noted that Madrian (1994) ﬁnds that her estimates of job-lock are not
sensitive to whether or not her job change variable includes those who change jobs involuntarily.
8those who receive EPHI. The predicted pattern is found for both married and single
employees, being these diﬀerences substantial (turnover rates for the uninsured are
more than double those of the insured).
This transition table only provides some descriptive evidence on the job-lock hy-
pothesis, since it focuses on EPHI and ignores other important factors inﬂuencing
turnover decisions. The core SIPP questionnaire also provides additional information
on a wide set of individual and job characteristics that aﬀect mobility decisions such
as age, sex, race, education, state of residence, family size, family non wage income,
industry, occupation, ﬁrm size, class of worker, wage, union membership, and tenure9
We also control for local labour market conditions by including states unemployment
rates over the estimation period as explanatory variables. This not only accounts for
their direct eﬀect on mobility but also for the likely correlation between business cycle
conditions and the employers’ incentives to provide health insurance and to contribute
a larger or smaller share of its cost. Regarding pension coverage information, unfor-
tunately it is not available on a four month basis but only on the seventh wave of the
panel, when a special topical module on pensions was administered.10
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the main individual and job related vari-
ables used in the statistical analyses for the entire sample of employees and for those
with and without EPHI. Consistent with the idea that jobs with health insurance are
“good” jobs, insured employees have higher wages and longer tenure. Moreover, em-
ployees holding EPHI are much more likely to work in a big ﬁrm, to be unionized and
to have a higher level of education. Overall, there are substantial diﬀerences between
the two groups in terms of most of the explanatory variables, which may suggest that
there might be diﬀerences in the unobservables as well.
9Although tenure may be seen as a problematic variable because it is the result of a sequential
set of quit decisions, it is important to include it because employees are often required to complete a
probationary period before they become eligible for health beneﬁts (Buchmueller and Valletta 1996;
Madrian 1994).
10Buchmueller and Valletta (1996) point out that pension coverage is likely to be correlated with
EPHI and therefore it should be incorporated into the model.
93 Estimation and Results
3.1 The Eﬀect of Employer-Provided Health Insurance on
Job Mobility
Consider the following model where Q is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the
employee quits his/her job and 0 otherwise:
Qit = β0 + β1EPHIit + β2Oit + β3(EPHIit ∗ Oit) + β4Xit + υit (1)
i = 1,...,N;t = 1,...,Ti
where i denotes individuals, N is the total number of individuals, t denotes time and Ti
is the number of time periods over which individual i is observed. EPHI is a dummy
variable that takes value one if the individual has employer-provided health insurance
and value zero otherwise. O represents health insurance coverage from a source other
than one’s current employer and EPHI∗O is the interaction of this source of coverage
and employment-provided health insurance. X denotes the other individual and job
characteristics inﬂuencing mobility decisions described in the previous section.
To explicitly account for the potential presence of individual speciﬁc eﬀects cor-
related with the regressors we assume that the error term, υit, can be decomposed
as
υit = ηi + εit (2)
where ηi denotes an unobservable individual speciﬁc eﬀect, which is assumed time-
invariant, εit ∼ IID(0,σ2
ε) and all the explanatory variables are assumed independent
of the εit for all i and t. ηi represents mover-stayer heterogeneity, which may reﬂect
factors such as individual-speciﬁc turnover propensities and risk aversion. For instance,
risk averse individuals are likely to prefer jobs that provide health insurance coverage,
and, at the same time, to be reluctant to move. Alternatively, one could also argue
that those employees who care a lot about their career and professional development
are likely to have “good” jobs that oﬀer health insurance and to be ready to move more
easily. What these examples show is that the coeﬃcients on EPHI and EPHI∗O are
10likely to be biased in the presence of individual speciﬁc eﬀects and that, in principle,
the bias could go in either direction.
In general, the factors mentioned above are likely to be correlated with EPHI
as well as with other explanatory variables such as education, wages or occupation.
If this is the case, and one mistakenly models ηi as independent of the explanatory
variables, there will be an omitted variable bias and maximum likelihood logit or probit
estimation techniques will fail to provide consistent estimates.
As a starting point and as a benchmark for later comparisons, equation 1 is es-
timated by using a logit model. In addition, we also use Chamberlain’s (1980) con-
ditional logit model to control for the ﬁxed eﬀects. Under the assumption that the
error term εit follows a logistic distribution, Chamberlain (1980) shows that consistent
estimates can be obtained by maximising a conditional version of the likelihood func-
tion in which the likelihood of a given mobility sequence is calculated conditional on
the total number of periods in which the individual changed jobs in the sequence. As
for the nature of this conditional likelihood function, it does not involve ηi, the ﬁxed
eﬀects, which are “diﬀerenced out”.
3.1.1 Logit Results
Logit coeﬃcient estimates are reported in Table 4 for married employees and in Table
5 for single employees, with columns 1 and 3 corresponding to the male and female
samples, respectively. First, consider the coeﬃcients on some of the explanatory vari-
ables. Consistent with previous studies, wages and union membership are negatively
associated with turnover for all the demographic groups, although the coeﬃcient on
union membership does not achieve standard levels of signiﬁcance for single women.
The eﬀect of an additional month of tenure is statistically signiﬁcant, positive and de-
creasing. Having children under 18 in the household signiﬁcantly reduces the turnover
probability only for women (although the eﬀect for married women is only signiﬁcant
at the 10% level). Being white is negatively associated with turnover for all groups ex-
cept for married men, and, in contrast with the results of Gruber and Madrian (1994),
education has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on mobility. This diﬀerence
11is likely due to the inclusion of a richer set of individual and job explanatory variables.
The estimate of the coeﬃcient on EPHI is negative and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level for all four demographic groups while the EPHI*Other Insurance
interaction coeﬃcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for the female and male
married employees samples. Therefore, having EPHI reduces the turnover probability
and having other source of insurance causes a greater change in mobility for those with
EPHI than for those without EPHI.
It is worth remarking that, since by far the most prevalent source of non-employment
based coverage is the employment-based health insurance available to one’s spouse, the
DD job-lock test based on the EPHI*Other Insurance interaction term is not feasible
for the sample of single employees. One might be concerned about the potential endo-
geneity of spousal health insurance in the DD job-lock test for married employees.11
However, Buchmueller and Valletta (1996) use data from the 1984 SIPP to estimate a
model that accounts for the joint nature of job change decisions by dual earner couples
and ﬁnd that the failure to account for the potential endogeneity of spousal health
insurance does not signiﬁcantly bias estimates of job-lock.
As mentioned in Section 2, pension coverage information is not available on a four
month basis but only on the seventh wave of the panel. Thus, the best we can do to
assess the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of pension coverage in the model
is to estimate a job turnover equation including pension coverage as an independent
variable by focusing on the information provided on the seventh wave of the 1996
SIPP panel and using a logit model. The results of this estimation, not reported in
the paper, do not signiﬁcantly alter the conclusions reached so far.
In order to assess the magnitude of job-lock and to facilitate comparisons with
the results of previous studies, we examine the slopes of the turnover probabilities
and their percentage variations.12 The marginal and percentage eﬀects corresponding
11None of the identiﬁcation strategies proposed in the literature are free from potential criticism.
Gruber and Madrian (2002) extensively discusss the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative
job-lock tests proposed and argue that using spousal health insurance to identify job-lock is the most
appealing approach.
12The marginal eﬀect for a binary independent variable is computed as
PS
j=1( ˆ Q1j− ˆ Q0j)
S , where S
12to the logit estimation are displayed in columns 1 and 3 of Table 6. For married
employees, as expected, the EPHI variable produces substantially larger percentage
job-lock eﬀects (65.81% for men and 56.96% for women) than the DD test, which
indicates a 30.80% reduction in mobility due to EPHI for men versus 20.16% for
women. For single employees, there is a 58.31% reduction in mobility due to EPHI for
men and a 62.27% for women.
All the models presented so far have also been estimated considering yearly instead
of four month turnover equations. The results obtained are qualitatively very similar
and therefore not reported, although the magnitude of the eﬀects is, not surprisingly,
generally somewhat smaller.
3.1.2 Conditional Logit Results
Conditional logit coeﬃcient estimates are reported in Table 4 for married employees
and in Table 5 for single employees, with columns 2 and 4 corresponding to the male
and female samples, respectively. As in the logit estimation, the estimate of the
coeﬃcient on EPHI is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level for all
four demographic groups whereas the EPHI*Other Insurance interaction coeﬃcient
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for the male and female married employees
samples. There are, however, substantial diﬀerences in the size of the coeﬃcients.
is the total number of observations and ˆ Q1j and ˆ Q0j denote the predicted probability of moving
for observation j when the dichotomous variable takes values 1 and 0 respectively (both EPHI and
the interaction term EPHI*Other Insurance are dummy variables). We evaluate the marginal ef-
fect at every observation and then compute the sample average. Standard errors are computed by
bootstrapping. The turnover probability’s percentage variation due to the EPHI variable is equal to
PS
j=1[( ˆ Q1j− ˆ Q0j)/ ˆ Q0j]
S ∗ 100. As for the EPHI*Other Ins. interaction term, it is computed as the DD















where ˆ Q11j, ˆ Q01j, ˆ Q10j and ˆ Q00j denote the predicted probability of moving for observation j when
having both EPHI and other insurance, only EPHI, only other insurance and no insurance at all,
respectively.
13Compared to the logit coeﬃcient estimates, the absolute value of the EPHI and the
EPHI*Other Insurance interaction coeﬃcients are bigger for both female and male
married employees. On the other hand, the absolute value of the EPHI coeﬃcient is
smaller for single men and bigger for single women. Concerning the coeﬃcients on
the other explanatory variables, most of them widely diﬀer from the logit coeﬃcient
estimates.
The marginal and percentage eﬀects corresponding to the conditional logit estima-
tion are reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 6.13 The DD test indicates a 33.50%
reduction in mobility due to EPHI for married women versus 45.43% for married men.
These eﬀects are substantially larger than the ones estimated using a logit model dis-
played in columns 1 and 3. For single men, the percentage reduction in mobility due to
EPHI corresponding to the conditional logit estimation (58.31%) is alsmost identical
to the one obtained when using a logit model (58.67%). As for the sample of single
women, it appears that holding EPHI reduces by 31.78% the turnover probability,
being this percentage substantially smaller than the one corresponding to the logit
estimation (62.27%).
Given the important diﬀerences that exist between the samples of employees with
and without EPHI in terms of most of the explanatory variables, as shown in Section
2, the fact that diﬀerent results are obtained when using logit and conditional logit
estimation techniques should not come as a surprise, as there might well be substantial
diﬀerences in the unobservables. To test for the presence of ﬁxed-individual eﬀects
we performed a Hausman-type test based on the diﬀerence between Chamberlain’s
conditional MLE and the standard logit MLE.14 The value of Hausman’s χ2 statistics
reported in columns 1 and 3, at the bottom of Tables 4 and 5 rejects the unconditional
logit results at the 1% level. Therefore, in what follows we primarily rely on the
13Note that in order to predict the turnover probabilities it is necessary to have an estimate of
ηi. We use the coeﬃcient estimates ˆ β to compute the value of ηi from the ﬁrst order conditions
corresponding to the ηi parameters in the joint maximum likelihood problem.
14The latter estimator is consistent and eﬃcient only under the null hypothesis of homogeneity (ηi =
η) and inconsistent under the alternative, whereas Chamberlain’s estimator is consistent whether the
null hypothesis is true or not.
14conditional logit estimates.
Regarding the conditional logit estimation technique, note that, since individuals
who never move or who move every interview are not used in the estimation, sample
sizes are now smaller. One may be concerned that the results obtained with the
conditional logit estimation are based on a very special sample of employees that
does not necessarily represent the population of employees. Comparison of descriptive
statistics for the samples used in the conditional logit estimations and the full samples
show that there are no major diﬀerences. In results not reported, we also estimate
a logit model on the samples used for the conditional logit estimations to see if the
estimates obtained are closer to the conditional logit estimates than the logit estimates
based on the full samples. Results from these analyses indicate that they are not.
Therefore, the diﬀerences between the logit and the conditional logit estimates do not
seem to be due to the fact that the latter are based on a special sample of employees.
3.1.3 Short-Run versus Long-Run Eﬀects
The short run versus long run nature of the job-lock problem is now investigated. The
time span of the 1996 SIPP panel is not long enough to estimate a three or even a two-
year turnover equation by using a conditional ﬁxed eﬀects logit model. However, it is
useful to do so by using a logit model, despite its limitations, to provide some evidence
on this issue. Table 7 summarises the results of estimating a three-year turnover
equation by using a logit model. The job-lock percentage eﬀects are substantially
smaller than those obtained when estimating four month turnover equations. However,
these eﬀects still range between 21% and 27% for all demographic groups and all the
corresponding coeﬃcients achieve standard levels of signiﬁcance. Hence, these results
support the view that the nature of the job-lock problem is not purely temporary.
3.2 Did HIPAA Reduce Job-Lock?
We now evaluate the extent to which HIPAA succeeded in mitigating insurance in-
duced mobility reductions. To this purpose, one could simply compare the magnitude
of job-lock before and after the HIPAA provisions became eﬀective. However, simple
15comparisons of pre-HIPAA and post-HIPAA job-lock magnitudes are likely to be con-
taminated by temporal trends in job-lock or by the eﬀect of events, other than the
legislation, that occurred between both periods. Ideally, the counterfactual exercise
one would like to do would be to compare the changes that are observed in states
in which the HIPAA provisions led to new group reforms to what would have hap-
pened over time in these same states had these reforms not taken place. It is not
possible to observe the latter. However, there are several states that had already met
all the HIPAA requirements in the pre-HIPAA period that can be used to identify
temporal variation in job-lock that is not due to HIPAA. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence (DDD) estimator is based on this idea.
To evaluate whether HIPAA succeeded in reducing job-lock, we use a DDD iden-
tiﬁcation strategy. This strategy consists in exploiting the variation across states in
the non redundancy of the HIPAA requirements to compare the change in job-lock in
the pre-HIPAA and the post-HIPAA periods in states which had to adopt legislation
to conform to the HIPAA requirements (Groups A, B, C and D in Table 1) with the
change in states that did not need to do so (Group E in Table 1).
We estimate an extended version of equation 1:
Qit = β0 + β1EPHIit + β2GroupADit + β3PostHIPAAit+ (3)
β4(EPHIit ∗ GroupADit ∗ PostHIPAAit) + β5(EPHIit ∗ GroupADit)+
β6(EPHIit ∗ PostHIPAAit) + β7(GroupADit ∗ PostHIPAAit) + β8Xit + υit
where GroupA-D is an indicator variable identifying employees working in a state
belonging to Group A, B, C or D, Post-HIPAA is an indicator variable marking
observations during the period after HIPAA became eﬀective and EPHI*GroupA-
D*Post-HIPAA is an interaction term between EPHI, GroupA-D and Post-HIPAA.
The pairwise interaction terms among these three variables are EPHI*GroupA-D,
EPHI*Post-HIPAA and GroupA-D*Post-HIPAA. The HIPAA protections generally
became eﬀective with new plan years (i.e., the renewal date of the plan) beginning on
or after July 1, 1997. Hence, in order to use in the estimation a post-HIPAA period
in which the legislation had surely had time to play out its eﬀects, we exclude all job
16transitions that took place between March 1997 and May 1998.
The DDD test is based on the coeﬃcient β4 and it requires that in absence of the
legislation, the average job-lock magnitude for all states would have followed paral-
lel paths over time. This assumption might be implausible if characteristics that are
thought to be associated with the dynamics of job-lock are unbalanced between the
states belonging to groups A, B, C and D and the states belonging to group E. There-
fore, it is necessary to control for a wide set of covariates, X , as done in the previous
analyses.
Table 8 displays the logit estimation results. Unexpectedly, given that HIPAA
aimed at reducing job-lock, logit coeﬃcients on the EPHI*GroupA-D*Post-HIPAA
interaction variable are negative for married men and women. However, coeﬃcient es-
timates for all demographic groups are statistically insigniﬁcant at conventional levels
of testing and translate into very small percentage eﬀects. The conditional logit est-
mation results, not reported, also indicate that HIPAA had no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on job-lock. However, note that only individuals who moved from/to a state
belonging to Groups A, B, C or D to/from a state belonging to Group E during the
estimation period are contributing to the eﬀect of interest. This is a small and very
selected subset of the population. Therefore, in this context we choose to rely on the
logit estimates, despite their limitations.
The classiﬁcation of states displayed in Table 1 also allows us to separately evaluate
the eﬀect of some of the HIPAA provisions. The impact of guaranteed issue in the
small group market is investigated by comparing Groups B and D, while Groups D
and E are compared in order to evaluate the eﬀect of prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of any health status related factor. The results of these analyses (not shown)
indicate that neither of these two provisions had a statistically signiﬁcant impact on
job-lock. Finally, we have replicated all the previous analyses restricting the sample
to workers aged over 45, obtaining very similar results.
174 Conclusions
This paper analyses data from the 1996 panel of the SIPP to investigate the eﬀect
of EPHI on job mobility from 1996 to 2000. First, we estimate the eﬀect of EPHI
on job turnover. We depart from previous studies by allowing for the possibility that
the holding of EPHI is correlated with unobserved individual heterogeneity that may
inﬂuence mobility decisions and modeling the heterogeneity as a ﬁxed eﬀect. We ﬁnd
that, after accounting for unobserved individual heterogeneity, EPHI substantially
reduces four month job turnover for all demographic groups. The estimated job-lock
eﬀects range between 31% and 58%. The evidence is also suggestive that the nature
of the job-lock problem is not temporary, since the job-lock eﬀects obtained when
estimating three year turnover equations still range between 21% and 27%.
Second, we evaluate whether the 1996 HIPAA succeeded in alleviating job-lock.
To this purpose, we exploit the variation across states in terms of their regulatory
environments prior to the federal legislation. The evidence suggests that HIPAA did
not succeed in reducing job-lock. This ﬁnding is consistent with Kapur’s (2003) con-
clusion that, as a package, small group health insurance reforms are unlikely to have a
large eﬀect on job mobility. The main reason why HIPAA had no impact on job-lock
is likely to be that it did not address the cost of health insurance, which is, accord-
ing to the Employee Beneﬁt Research Institute’s 1998 Health Conﬁdence Survey, the
most frequently cited cause of job-lock (Employee Beneﬁt Research Institute, 1998).
HIPAA contained provisions designed to improve portability and intended to assure
availability and renewability of health insurance coverage, but it did not specify the
price at which insurance must be oﬀered, therefore not ensuring aﬀordability of health
insurance.
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20Appendix
PRE-HIPAA STATE GROUPS
• GROUP A: Alabama.
• GROUP B: Illinois, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, West
Virginia.
• GROUP C: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Wyoming, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin.
• GROUP D: California, Minnesota, Texas.
• GROUP E: Arkansas, Connecticut, DC, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Washington, Maine, Vermont.
21Table 1: States Regulations Prior to HIPAA
Regulations State Groups
prior to HIPAA Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E
Limits on
Pre-ex.conditions No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group to Group
Portability No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Guaranteed
Renewal No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Guaranteed
Issue No No Some Products Yes Yes
Health Allowed
as Rating Factor? Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Note: Information based on the database collected by the Institute for Health Policy Solu-
tions.









Note: Statistics based on the observations for which complete information is available on all
the variables used in the statistical analyses.
22Table 3: Sample Means of Key Variables
Employer-Provided Health Insurance All
Yes No
(1) (2) (3)
Leave Job 0.05 0.14 0.08
(0.22) (0.35) (0.27)
EPHI - - 0.67
(0.47)
Other Insurance 0.09 0.54 0.23
(0.28) (0.49) (0.42)
EPHI*Other Ins. - - 0.06
(0.23)
ln(Hourly Wage) 2.60 2.19 2.46
(0.55) (0.57) (0.59)
Months Tenure 112.62 60.60 95.48
(96.70) (71.50) (92.48)
Small Firm 0.09 0.31 0.17
(0.29) (0.46) (0.37)
Medium Firm 0.11 0.14 0.12
(0.31) (0.35) (0.33)
Big Firm 0.78 0.53 0.70
(0.40) (0.49) (0.45)
Union Member 0.22 0.06 0.17
(0.41) (0.25) (0.37)
Age 39.90 38.95 39.59
(8.35) (8.33) (8.35)
Male 0.54 0.35 0.48
(0.49) (0.47) (0.49)
Married 0.63 0.71 0.66
(0.48) (0.45) (0.47)
Non-White 0.15 0.17 0.15
(0.36) (0.37) (0.36)
ln(Family non Wage Income) 2.91 2.88 2.90
(2.60) (2.77) (2.66)
Nr. Children<18 0.84 1.05 0.91
(1.09) (1.18) (1.12)
No High School Degree 0.06 0.14 0.09
(0.24) (0.35) (0.28)
High School Degree 0.29 0.34 0.30
(0.45) (0.47) (0.46)
Some College 0.31 0.31 0.31
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
College Degree 0.21 0.14 0.19
(0.40) (0.35) (0.39)
Graduate Degree 0.11 0.05 0.09
(0.31) (0.23) (0.29)
N. Obs. 143,061 70,299 213,360
23Table 4: Job Turnover Logit and Conditional Logit Coeﬃcient Estimates. Married
Employees
Married Men Married Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variable Logit Cond. Logit Logit Cond. Logit
EPHI -1.172** -1.298** -0.911** -1.125**
(0.047) (0.069) (0.052) (0.082)
Other Insurance -0.466** -0.521** -0.360** -0.392**
(0.048) (0.095) (0.043) (0.085)
EPHI*Other Ins. 0.274** 0.451** 0.188* 0.257*
(0.091) (0.128) (0.078) (0.116)
ln(Hourly Wage) -0.306** -0.501** -0.287** -0.478**
(0.033) (0.051) (0.035) (0.057)
Months Tenure -0.007** 0.015** 0.008** 0.019**
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001)
Months Tenure2/100 0.001** -0.003** 0.001** -0.005**
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Small ﬁrm 0.073˜ 0.291** 0.027 0.032
(0.043) (0.071) (0.037) (0.065)
Medium ﬁrm 0.099* 0.218** 0.069 -0.024
(0.045) (0.067) (0.044) (0.067)
Union member -0.201** -0.163˜ -0.238** -0.246*
(0.051) (0.093) (0.060) (0.101)
Age -0.006 -0.038 -0.062** -0.290**
(0.019) (0.095) (0.018) (0.094)
Age2/100 -0.007 0.056 0.062** 0.344**
(0.024) (0.111) (0.023) (0.109)
Non-White -0.002 - 0.139** -
(0.046) (0.043)
ln(Family non Wage income) 0.026** 0.010 0.022** 0.031**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010)
Nr. Children<18 -0.021 -0.175** -0.028˜ 0.006
(0.013) (0.053) (0.014) (0.058)
High School Degree 0.236** - 0.027 -
(0.052) (0.054)
Some College 0.202** - 0.157** -
(0.055) (0.056)
College Degree 0.280** - 0.091 -
(0.064) (0.065)
Graduate Degree 0.310** - 0.207* -
(0.076) (0.082)
N. Obs. 72,644 22,660 68,570 23,333
Log-Likelihood -16722.5 -6726.6 -17681.2 -7134.3
χ2 Hausman Test 781.41** 896.69**
Note: The dependent variable takes value 1 if the employee leaves his/her job in the next
four months and 0 otherwise. Additional control variables are industry, occupation, class
of worker, state, year and quarter dummies and states unemployment rates. The year and
quarter dummies are actually dummies for the year and the quarter in which the four month
period begins respectively. Standard errors in parentheses with p<0.1=˜, p<0.05=* and
p<0.01=**. “-” denotes variables not included in the conditional logit estimations because
they are time-invariant.
24Table 5: Job Turnover Logit and Conditional Logit Coeﬃcient Estimates. Single
Employees
Single Men Single Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variable Logit Cond. Logit Logit Cond. Logit
EPHI -0.999** -0.894** -1.092** -1.151**
(0.049) (0.072) (0.045) (0.067)
ln(Hourly Wage) -0.231** -0.293** -0.243** -0.325**
(0.045) (0.073) (0.046) (0.068)
Months Tenure -0.008** 0.017** -0.008** 0.018**
(0.0007) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.001)
Months Tenure2/100 0.002** -0.004** 0.001** -0.005**
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0006)
Small ﬁrm -0.060 0.016 -0.029 0.049
(0.052) (0.090) (0.046) (0.077)
Medium ﬁrm -0.018 -0.020 0.0001 -0.118
(0.056) (0.091) (0.053) (0.078)
Union member -0.212** -0.129 -0.093 -0.252*
(0.071) (0.126) (0.070) (0.123)
Age -0.024 -0.151 -0.018 0.036
(0.023) (0.120) (0.020) (0.100)
Age2/100 0.006 0.196 -0.0001 -0.008
(0.031) (0.147) (0.026) (0.121)
Non-White 0.105* - 0.019 -
(0.052) (0.043)
ln(Family non Wage income) 0.003 0.040* -0.0008 0.0003
(0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.012)
Nr. Children<18 0.033 0.097 -0.051** -0.034
(0.036) (0.118) (0.019) (0.069)
High School Degree 0.241** - 0.085 -
(0.068) (0.057)
Some College 0.326** - 0.238** -
(0.071) (0.073)
College Degree 0.227** - 0.190* -
(0.084) (0.095)
Graduate Degree 0.401** - 0.185* -
(0.108) (0.120)
N. Obs. 30,843 10,834 41,303 14,715
Log-Likelihood -9324.3 -3424.0 -11911.8 -4640.1
χ2 Hausman Test 352.57** 417.06**
Note: See note to Table 4.
25Table 6: Eﬀect of Employer-Provided Health Insurance on Job Turnover
Married Men Married Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Cond. Logit Logit Cond. Logit
Marginal Eﬀects
EPHI -0.087 -0.144 -0.061 -0.001
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.00001)
EPHI*Other Ins. 0.018 0.050 0.014 0.0004
(0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.00001)
% Reduction in Mobility due to:
EPHI 65.81 66.83 56.94 67.50
EPHI*Other Ins. 30.80 45.43 20.16 33.50
Single Men Single Women
Marginal Eﬀects
EPHI -0.097 -0.019 -0.099 -0.232
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004)
% Reduction in Mobility due to:
EPHI 58.67 58.31 62.27 31.78
Note: Marginal and percentage eﬀects have been computed using the coeﬃcient estimates
reported in Tables 4 and 5. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
26Table 7: Eﬀect of Employer-Provided Health Insurance on 3-Year Job Turnover. Logit
Estimates
Married Employees Single Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women Men Women
Coeﬃcients
EPHI -0.756** -0.582** -0.702** -0.724**
(0.105) (0.115) (0.120) (0.145)
Other Insurance -0.326** -0.349** - -
(0.123) (0.111)
EPHI*Other Ins. 0.424* 0.497** - -
(0.168) (0.149)
Marginal Eﬀects
EPHI -0.171 -0.128 -0.155 -0.158
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003)
EPHI*Other Ins. 0.093 0.105 - -
(0.0001) (0.0002)
% Reduction in Mobility due to:
EPHI 31.89 24.50 25.27 27.05
EPHI*Other Ins. 21.81 24.02 - -
N. Obs. 6,273 5,992 2,410 3,357
Log-Likelihood -3920.7 -3724.0 -1507.0 -2047.3
Note: The dependent variable takes value 1 if the employee leaves his/her job in the next
three years and 0 otherwise. Additional control variables are ln(hourly wage), months tenure,
months tenure2/100, union membership, age, age2/100, non-white dummy, ln(family non
wage income), nr. children<18, ﬁrm size, education, industry, occupation, class of worker,
state and month dummies and states unemployment rates. The month dummies are ac-
tually dummies for the month in which the four month period begins. Standard errors in
parentheses with p<0.1=˜, p<0.05=* and p<0.01=**.
27Table 8: Job Turnover Logit Coeﬃcient Estimates. The Impact of HIPAA on Job-Lock
Married Employees Single Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women Men Women
Coeﬃcients
EPHI -1.225** -0.762** -0.938** -1.122**
(0.100) (0.095) (0.118) (0.104)
Group A-D -0.021 0.008 0.135 0.019
(0.081) (0.062) (0.100) (0.083)
Post-HIPAA -0.277** -0.282** -0.128 -0.423**
(0.093) (0.072) (0.112) (0.095)
EPHI*GroupA-D*Post-HIPAA -0.079 -0.028 0.120 0.007
(0.149) (0.147) (0.186) (0.167)
Marginal Eﬀects
EPHI*GroupA-D*Post-HIPAA -0.005 -0.001 0.009 0.0006
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00002)
% Variation in Job-Lock due to HIPAA:
3.58 5.21 -6.17 -0.07
N. Obs. 54,739 51,783 23,280 31,041
Log-Likelihood -12814.0 -13680.8 -7258.2 -9049.6
Note: The dependent variable takes value 1 if the employee leaves his/her job in the next
four months and 0 otherwise. Additional control variables are EPHI*GroupA-D, EPHI*Post-
HIPAA, GroupA-D*Post-HIPAA, ln(hourly wage), months tenure, months tenure2/100,
union membership, age, age2/100, non-white dummy, ln(family non wage income), nr.
children<18, ﬁrm size, education, industry, occupation, class of worker and quarter dum-
mies and states unemployment rates. The quarter dummies are actually dummies for quar-
ter in which the four month period begins. Standard errors in parentheses with p<0.1=˜,
p<0.05=* and p<0.01=**.
28